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Abstract. The squash operation, or the squashing model, is a useful mathematical
tool for proving the security of quantum key distribution systems using practical (i.e.,
non-ideal) detectors. At the present, however, this method can only be applied to a
limited class of detectors, such as the threshold detector of the Bennett-Brassard 1984
type. In this paper we generalize this method to include multi-partite measurements,
such that it can be applied to a wider class of detectors. We demonstrate the
effectiveness of this generalization by applying it to the device-independent security
proof of the Ekert 1991 protocol, and by improving the associated key generation
rate. For proving this result we use two physical assumptions, namely, that quantum
mechanics is valid, and that Alice’s and Bob’s detectors are memoryless.
1. Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1] is a technique for distributing information-
theoretically secure secret keys between two parties connected by a quantum channel.
Beginning from the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) [1], and the Ekert 1991 protocols
[2], there is now a variety of protocols proposed, e.g., [3, 4, 5, 6, 7]. Several different
approaches have been advanced for proving the security of QKD systems using the ideal
qubit detectors [8, 9, 10].
The squash operation, or the squashing model, is a useful mathematical tool for
proving the security of QKD systems using practical (i.e., non-ideal) detectors [11, 12].
Once its existence is proved for a given practical detector, one can incorporate it into
a conventional type of security proof where receivers have ideal qubit detectors, and
automatically obtains a new proof that remains valid even if the practical detectors are
used. The squash operation literally squashes an incoming state to a qubit, and also has
a property that, when followed by qubit measurements, it acts exactly the same way as
the practical detector. In security proofs, there is no loss of generality in supposing that
‡ Present address: Advanced Data Solutions, Corporate Marketing Department, Teikoku Data Bank,
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the squash operation is conducted by the attacker, and as the result of that, the security
of a protocol using practical detectors is reduced to that using ideal qubit detectors.
A type of squash operation was first assumed in the security proof by Gottesman et
al. [13], however, its existence was only conjectured, no proof was given. The first proof
was given by one of the present authors and Tamaki [11], for the case of the threshold
detector of the BB84 type measurement. This result was also verified independently by
Beaudry, Moroder, and Lu¨tkenhaus [12]. There were also efforts toward constructing
squash operations for a wider class of practical detectors. For example, Beaudry et al.
gave an explicit condition for the existence of a squash operation, and used it to show
positive and negative results on the six-state protocol with threshold detectors [12].
Later their techniques were refined further and applied to other types of measurement
devices [14]. In Ref. [15], one of the present authors discussed whether symmetries of
a given detector can imply the existence of the squash operation corresponding to it,
and also showed that the above result on the BB84 type measurement is valid even for
multi-mode cases. In addition to these uses in quantum cryptography, Moroder et al.
applied the squash operation to entanglement verification with realistic measurement
devices [16].
Despite all these efforts, however, the method of the squash operation is still
applicable only to a limited class of measurement devices. In fact, even if we
restrict ourselves to qubit measurements of the BB84 type, we can easily construct
counterexamples to its existence (see Lemma 3 in Section 3).
In this paper, we demonstrate that the situation changes drastically by considering
a generalized case where multi-partite measurements are involved. That is, while all
previous studies on the squash operation were concerned only with detectors used
by a single player, we here consider a generalization including global measurements
performed jointly by two players or more, such as the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt
(CHSH) measurement [17], used e.g. in the E91 protocol. This approach allows us to
relax mathematical conditions required for the existence of the squash operation, such
that they can be fulfilled for a wider class of detectors. Perhaps this is most easily
illustrated by considering the CHSH measurement as an example. If one regards the
CHSH measurement as a mixture of local x, z-basis measurements performed by Alice
and Bob, there are two basis for each player, which together yield four conditions that the
squash operation has to satisfy. On the contrary, if one regards the same measurement
as one global measurement, there is no basis choice, and thus only one condition is
required for the existence of the squash operation.
As an evidence of the effectiveness of this generalization, we apply it to the device-
independent security analysis of the E91 protocol, and improve the key generation rate
known so far: The security of the E91 protocol using arbitrary detectors can be reduced
to that of the BB84 protocol using single photon detectors, and that allows us to prove
the asymptotic key generation rate R = 1 − h((2 + √2)p) − fech(p), with p being
the quantum error rate (QBER), h(p) the binary entropy, and fec the efficiency of
error correction. This rate R is higher than in the previous literature on the device-
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independent E91 protocol [18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23], except the one assuming collective
attacks, a very limited attack scenario [24] (see Figure 1). For example, when the
optimal error correcting code with fec = 1 is available, one can generate the secret key
with the QBER up to 5.4%.
For obtaining this result, we use the same physical assumptions as in Ref. [19].
Namely, we assume that quantum mechanics is valid, and that Alice’s and Bob’s
detectors are memoryless, i.e., different detectors operate on different Hilbert spaces. In
comparison with the other existing literature, these assumptions are weaker than in Ref.
[24], where collective attacks are assumed, but stronger than in Refs. [20, 21, 22, 23],
where detectors are not necessarily memoryless. They are also stronger than in Ref.
[18], which does not assume quantum mechanics.
Our security proof of the E91 protocol proceeds as follows. In the first step,
we convert the E91 protocol using arbitrary detectors into a simplified version where
uncharacterized qubit detectors are used. For this purpose we borrow the technique used
in Ref. [24], and the result is that, without loss of security, we may restrict ourselves to
a protocol where Alice and Bob use qubit detectors, parameterized by complex numbers
α, β. In the next step, we eliminate the α, β-dependence by applying a bipartite squash
operation Fα,β, which is designed such that the CHSH measurement, jointly performed
by Alice and Bob, is transformed to the phase error measurement of the BB84 type,
also jointly performed by the two players. Fα,β is also designed so that it leaves Alice’s
sifted-key measurement unchanged. As a consequence, the original E91 protocol is
transformed to the BB84 protocol, which can readily be shown secure by referring to
the existing literature, e.g., [8, 25, 26, 27].
The crucial observation here is that the minimum entropy of Alice’s sifted key
depends only on the results of Alice’s sifted-key measurement, and of the CHSH
measurements on sample pulses. No other measurements affect the sifted key as they
are performed locally and remotely from it. Hence for proving the security of the E91
protocol, it suffices to find a squash operation that properly transforms the CHSH and
Alice’s sifted-key measurement. While the previous formulation based on the one-partite
squash operation demands four conditions, corresponding to Alice’s and Bob’s choices
of x, z basis, which cannot be fulfilled in general, the bipartite generalization demands
only two. This is why this new setting realizes the security proofs that were not possible
previously.
2. Review of concepts regarding quantum key distribution and the security
In this section, we clarify the notation and concepts to be used in this paper. In
particular, we explain the security criteria of QKD protocols, and review the previous
method of the squash operation, restricted to one-partite measurement.
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2.1. ε-security and the smooth minimum entropy
For the sake of simplicity, we restrict ourselves to entanglement-based QKD protocols.
Also for the sake of simplicity, we assume that the secret key length is constant; i.e., we
only consider the type of protocols where Alice and Bob decide whether the protocol is
aborted or not, by checking the measurement results of randomly chosen sample pulses,
and when it continues, the generated secret key has a fixed bit length l. Such protocols
can typically be described as follows.
Procotol 1 (PR1): Typical entanglement-based protocol using detector Mc.
(i) (Quantum communication) Eve generates quantum state ρABE , and sends its
sub-states in HA and HB, each consisting of N tensor products of a Hilbert
space HM , to Alice and Bob, respectively.
(ii) (Basis choice) For each pulse i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, Alice (resp., Bob) chooses bases
cA,i ∈ {z, x} (resp., cB,i ∈ {z, x}).
(iii) (Quantum measurement) Alice (resp., Bob) measures them using operators
MAi (rA,i|cA,i) (resp., MBi (rB,i|cB,i)), and record the results rA,i (resp., rB,i).
(iv) (Determining whether continuing the protocol or not) Alice and Bob
communicate through the public channel, and decides sample pulses Ismp ⊂
{1, . . . , N}, and sifted key pulses Isif ⊂ {1, . . . , N} in such a way that Ismp∩Isif =
∅. By checking the measurement results of sample pulses Ismp, they decide
whether they continue or abort the protocol.
If they continue, Alice lets her measurement results of sifted key pulses Isif be
her sifted key u.
(v) (Alice’s privacy amplification) Alice randomly selects hash function fpa and
announces it to Bob. She then inputs her sifted key u to fpa and obtains her
secret key k = fpa(u) of l bits, and stores it in HK .
(vi) (Bob’s post-processing) Alice calculates syndrome of her sifted key u, and
announces it to Bob. Bob lets his measurement results of sifted key pulses Isif
be his sifted key u′. He corrects errors in u′ using syndrome, and by inputting
the outcome to a hash function fpa, he obtains his secret key.
In what follows, we denote all data announced in the public channel by a random
variable V , Alice’s secret key by K, and the final state corresponding to the initial state
by ρABE . Eve eavesdrops information regarding the secret key K by referring to V and
measuring her sub-state in HE. The security against this attack is usually analyzed by
defining the ideal state, and then evaluating how close it is with the actual state. It is
customary to define the ideal state to be where Alice’s secret key K seen from Eve is
the perfectly uniform random source, i.e., ρKmix ⊗ ρV E with ρKmix = 2−l
∑2l−1
k=0 |k〉〈k|. It
is also customary to use the trace distance for evaluating the closeness with the actual
state.
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Definition 1 We say that a given QKD protocol is ε-secure if the following relation
holds for an arbitrary attack by Eve:
d1(ρ
KVE |V E) := ∥∥ρKVE − ρKmix ⊗ ρV E∥∥1 ≤ ε. (1)
As shown in Ref. [28], this definition of security satisfies universal composability.
As emphasized by Renner [25], in evaluating the trace distance d1(ρ
KVE|V E), it
is useful to consider the smooth minimum entropy Hε
′
min(ρ
UV E |V E) of sifted key U ,
because it allows the use of mathematical tools similar to those of the Shannon theory.
This property is sufficient for bounding the trace distance from above, i.e.,
Lemma 1 If function fpa,V for privacy amplification is randomly chosen from a
universal2 function family [29], then for any (sub-normalized) sifted key state ρ
UV E,
d1(ρ
KVE |V E) = d1(ρfpa,V (U)V E |V E) ≤ 2ε′ + 2−
1
2
(
Hε
′
min
(ρUV E |V E)−l
)
. (2)
Here we denoted hash function fpa by fpa,V in order to emphasize that it is determined
uniquely by the public communication V . We note that there is a useful generalization
for this lemma using dual universal2 functions [30, 31], which allows the use of practically
useful hash functions [32].
According to this lemma, once a lower bound on Hε
′
min(ρ
UV E |V E) is obtained for a
given protocol, its security follows immediately. For example, if one can somehow prove
that
H
ε/4
min(ρ
UV E |V E) ≥ l + 2 log2
1
ε
+ 6 (3)
holds for an arbitrary attack by Eve, then Lemma 1 guarantees that condition (1) of
Definition 1, and thus the protocol is ε-secure.
As we restrict ourselves to entanglement-based protocols in this paper, once Eve
fixes the initial state ρABE , the state ρUV E describing Alice’s sifted key and Eve is
uniquely determined, as well as ρKVE describing Alice’s secret key and Eve. This fact
can be used to simplify the notation to some extent. Define a (not necessarily trace
preserving) completely positive map Πsif for describing Alice’s sifted key generation, Πpa
for her privacy amplification, and Πsec = Πpa ◦Πsif for secret key generation. Then ρUV E
can be denoted as ρUV E = Πsif(ρ
ABE), ρKVE = Πsec(ρ
ABE). Here we use a convention
that ρU,V=v
′,E = ρK,V=v
′,E = 0 when protocol is aborted and no secret key is generated
(i.e., v′ denotes a record of public communication that includes “abort”). We also use
the notations, ρKVE∗ , ρ
UV E
∗ , Πsec,∗, Πsif,∗, with symbol ∗ specifying the protocol or game
used. For example, ρKVEPR1 is the final state generated by Protocol 1 (PR1) from the
initial state ρABE , i.e., ρKVEPR1 = Πsec,PR1(ρ
ABE).
In these notations, condition (1) of Definition 1 can be rewritten as
max
ρABE
d1(Πsec(ρ
ABE)|V E) ≤ ε. (4)
Similarly, eq. (3), which is a sufficient condition for (4), can be rewritten as
min
ρABE
H
ε/4
min(Πsif(ρ
ABE)|V E) ≥ l + 2 log2
1
ε
+ 6. (5)
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2.2. Previous method using squash operations
As mentioned in Introduction, the squash operation is a mathematical tool that
translates the security of a given QKD system using practical detectors into that of
qubit-based protocol. In this subsection we review this method, based on the results
of Ref. [11]. For the sake of simplicity, we will continue to restrict ourselves to
entanglement-based protocols, although the method presented below can also be applied
to prepare-and-measure protocols.
Consider a QKD system where Alice’s and Bob’s detectors are not necessarily ideal
qubit detectors, and denote the Hilbert space of their input by HM . For instance, for
the threshold detector (see, e.g., Ref. [11]), HM is the Fock space representing multi-
photons. For the sake of simplicity, we will further assume that measurement basis c
is chosen from {x, z}, and that the measurement outcome is r ∈ {±1}. We denote the
corresponding POVM in HM by M(r|c). For later convenience, we also define operator
M(c) := M(+1|c)−M(−1|c). In this setting, the squash operation is defined as follows.
Definition 2 (1-partite squash operation) A squash operation is a quantum
operation (i.e., a trace-preserving and completely positive (TPCP) map) F : HM → H2,
satisfying,
M(x) = F †(X), (6)
M(z) = F †(Z), (7)
where X, Z denote the Pauli matrices of the x, z basis.
Here, F † denotes the Hermitian conjugate of F , i.e., the operator satisfying tr(MF (ρ)) =
tr(F †(M)ρ) for arbitrary state ρ and measurement M .
Definition 2 demands that measuring any state with an arbitrary basis c ∈ {x, z}
using M(c) = M(+1|c) −M(−1|c) is equivalent to performing squash operation F on
the state and then measuring the resulting qubit state with the Pauli operators X,Z.
If such operation F exists, all measurements in Protocol 1 performed by Alice and Bob
using M(r|c) (c ∈ {X,Z}) can be decomposed into F followed by the normal qubit
measurements using X,Z. In security proofs, there is no loss of generality in supposing
that F is conducted by the attacker, so the security of Protocol 1 above can be reduced
to that of the following protocol [11].
Protocol 2 (PR2): A qubit-based protocol.
Same as Protocol 1 except
(i) Eve generates quantum state ρA¯B¯E, where HA¯ and HB¯ consists of qubit spaces.
Then she sends its sub-states in HA¯ and HB¯ to Alice and Bob, respectively.
(iii) Alice (Bob) measures pulse i using the Pauli operators XA, ZA (resp., XB, ZB)
corresponding to basis cA,i = x, z (cB,i = x, z), and record the results rA,i (rB,i).
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In terms of the trace distance and the smooth minimum entropy, we have the
following relations.
Lemma 2 Let ρKVEPR1 and ρ
KVE
PR2 be the final states generated as a result of Protocol 1
and 2, respectively, then we have
max
ρABE
d1(ρ
KV E
PR1 |V E) ≤ max
ρA¯B¯E
d1(ρ
KV E
PR2 |V E). (8)
Similarly, let ρUV EPR1 and ρ
UV E
PR2 be the sifted-key states generated by Protocol 1 and 2,
respectively, then
min
ρABE
Hmin(ρ
UV E
PR1 ) ≥ min
ρA¯B¯E
Hmin(ρ
UV E
PR2 ). (9)
In Appendix B, we give a formal proof of this lemma.
According to Lemma 2, once the squash operation F is shown to exist for a given
detector M(r|c), any security proof of a qubit-based protocol remains valid even when
the qubit detectors are replaced with M(r|c). In other words, once F is known to exist
for a practical detector M(r|c), it always suffices to consider the simplified case where
the ideal qubit detectors are used; all analyses related with M(r|c) become unnecessary.
This is the advantage of considering the squash operation.
3. Multi-partite squash operations
3.1. Motivation
As we have seen in the previous section, once the squash operation F is shown to exist
for a practical detector M(r|c), it serves as a very useful tool for analyzing protocols
involving M(r|c). At the present, however, F is shown to exist for a relatively limited
class of detectors, e.g., the threshold detector of the BB84 type measurement [11, 12, 15],
and of the six-state measurement with a passive basis choice [12], and a few others [14].
In fact, even if we restrict ourselves to qubit measurements of the BB84 type, we can
easily construct counterexamples of F :
Lemma 3 (limitation of the 1-partite squash operation for a qubit) In the no-
tation of Definition 2, let M(x) = Xα, M(z) = Z with Xα being the generalized X oper-
ator, defined in Appendix A. If α 6= i,−i, there exists no squash operation F satisfying
conditions (6), (7).
This can be verified readily by checking conditions (3a), (3b), (3c) of Ref. [12].
The lemma says that even if one uses perfectly sensitive qubit detectors Xα, Z, the
corresponding F does not exist unless the alignment of the x, z axes (corresponding to
α) is also perfect§. Hence one cannot hope to apply the method of the 1-partite squash
operation to general detectors and reduce the security proof to qubit spaces. Note that
§ It should be noted that the lemma may not be true if the x, z measurements are embedded in more
than two dimensions, or if their sensitivities are not perfect. In fact this is why F exists for many
practical cases listed above the lemma.
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this difficulty applies to any protocol using measurements of the BB84 type, including
the E91 protocol.
In the rest of this paper, we show that this situation changes drastically by
considering a generalized setting where multi-partite measurements are involved. That
is, while all previous studies of the squash operation were concerned with a detector used
by a single player, we here consider a generalization including measurements performed
jointly by two players or more, such as the Bell and the CHSH measurements. This
approach allows us to relax mathematical conditions required for the existence of the
squash operation, such that they can be fulfilled for a wider class of measurements.
3.2. Definition
We write down the definition for the multi-partite case. This is a simple generalization
of the one-partite squash operation of the previous section. Consider a situation where
n players P1, . . . , Pn agree on a basis choice c and perform (possibly non-local) n-partite
measurements in the Hibert state HP1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ HPn using operator M(r|c) to obtain
an outcome r. Here the basis choice c can be a list (c1, . . . , cn) consisting of Pi’s
choices ci, but is not limited to this type. More generally, it may also specify non-local
measurements, such as the CHSH measurement, denoted by c = CHSH. We assume
that c is chosen from a predetermined set C. We also assume there are measurement
operators m(r|c) defined for the same variables r, c, which operate in n-qubit spaces
H¯P1⊗· · ·⊗H¯Pn . In this setting, the multi-partite squash operation is defined as follows.
Definition 3 (n-partite squash operation) The squash operation for n-partite
measurements M(r|c) and m(r|c) is a quantum operation F : HP1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ HPn →
H¯P1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ H¯Pn which satisfies an equality
M(r|c) = F †(m(r|c)) (10)
or an inequality
M(r|c) ≥ F †(m(r|c)) (11)
for each basis choice c ∈ C.
In the following sections, we show that this generalized approach can be used to
prove the security of the E91 protocol using any detectors. This is an evidence that our
approach indeed allows to apply the squash operation to a wider class of protocols or
detectors than previously possible, including the counterexample given in Lemma 3.
4. Application of bipartite squash operation: device-independent QKD
protocol
In order to demonstrate the effectiveness of the multi-partite squash operation,
introduced in the previous section, we apply it to the device-independent security proof
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of the E91 protocol using arbitrary detectors, and obtain the device-independent key
generation rate R = 1 − h ((2 +√2)p)− fech(p), improved upon those obtained in the
previous literature.
4.1. Outline of the proof
In this paper we only consider the types of post-processing algorithms which execute bit
error correction and privacy amplification as independent processes and do not exploit
their correlations. Hence the security analysis amounts to evaluating the minimum
entropy Hmin(ρ
UV E |V E) associated with the joint state U ρUV E of Alice’s sifted key and
Eve’s quantum state V E, conditioned on the result of the CHSH test performed by Alice
and Bob. Then by assuming that Alice’s and Bob’s detectors are memoryless, we can
neglect back reactions from Bob’s sifted key measurement (the z′-basis measurement),
since it does not affect ρUV E, to be evaluated. Hence it suffices to analyze how
ρUV E behaves under Alice’s sifted-key measurement and the CHSH measurement, both
consisting only of the x- and the z-basis measurements by Alice and Bob.
4.1.1. Reduction to the qubit-based E91 protocol with uncharacterized X measurement
The first crucial step is to reduce this evaluation of ρUV E to the case where only
(generalized) qubit detectors are used. Borrowing the argument of Ref. [24], we can
actually assume, without loss of generality, that input pulses to Alice and Bob are all
qubits, and that they measure them using the generalized x, z measurements in qubit
space, defined by‖
XAα =
(
0 α
α∗ 0
)
, XBβ =
(
0 β
β∗ 0
)
, ZA = ZB =
(
0 1
1 0
)
, (12)
with α, β being complex numbers satisfying |α| = |β| = 1. Parameters α and β are
chosen arbitrary by Eve and may vary for different qubit pairs i. Accordingly, we may
assume that Alice’s sifted-key measurement and the CHSH measurement are
Mα,β(cA = z) = Z
A ⊗ IB, (13)
Mα,β(CHSH) =
1
4
(ZA ⊗ ZB + ZA ⊗XBβ +XAα ⊗ ZB −XAα ⊗XBβ ). (14)
The details of this reduction to qubit spaces are presented in Lemma 6 and in
Appendix D. In short, it suffices to evaluate Hmin(ρ
UV E |V E), supposing that Alice and
Bob jointly perform qubit-pair measurements (13), (14), with α, β chosen arbitrarily by
Eve.
4.1.2. Bipartite squash operation The second step is to eliminate uncontrollable
parameters α, β, chosen by Eve, by a security reduction using the squash operation. As
‖ Throughout the paper, we represent the Pauli matrices in the y-basis. For details see Appendix A.
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we will prove in Theorem 2 of Section 5.4, there exists a bipartite squash operation Fα,β
satisfying
F †α,β(Z
A ⊗ IB) = ZA ⊗ IB,
F †α,β
(
I+ (
√
2− 1)XA ⊗XB
)
≥ 2Mα,β(CHSH),
where XA and XB are the usual Pauli operators: XA = XA−i, X
B = XB−i, with i =
√−1
being the imaginary unit. By using this Fα,β , the evaluation of Hmin(ρ
UV E |V E) with
qubit-pair measurement operators being (13), (14) is reduced to the analysis of the
BB84 protocol using sifted-key measurement ZA⊗ IB and the phase error measurement
XA ⊗XB.
As a result, the security of the device-independent E91 protocol is reduced to that
of the BB84 protocol, which has been fully analyzed in the existing literature, e.g.,
[8, 25, 26, 27]. These are the main ideas of our security proof.
4.2. Description of the Ekert 1991 protocol
We consider the following version of the E91 protocol.
4.2.1. Assumptions We use two assumptions for the security proof in the subsequent
sections. The first assumption is that quantum mechanics is valid. The second
assumption is for detectors: Recall that we only consider the type of protocol where
Eve prepares the initial state first, and Alice and Bob measure it using N detectors
respectively, with N denoting the number of raw key bits. In this setting we assume
that these 2N detectors are memoryless, or uncorrelated with each other.
The precise description of the second condition is as follows. Let us use variable
P ∈ {A,B} to denote players Alice and Bob. We assume that the Hilbert space
representing player P ’s incoming state is clustered as HP = HP1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ HPN , and that
detector i ∈ {1, . . . , N} operates only in subspace HPi . In other words, we assume that
the i-th detector of player P takes the form
I
P
1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ IPi−1 ⊗MPi (r|c)⊗ IPi+1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ IPN , (15)
where c denotes the basis choice, r ∈ {±1} the output, and IPi the identity operator of
HPi . We emphasize here thatMPi with different P or i may be different from each other.
In what follows we consider the situation where this conditions is guaranteed somehow,
e.g., by shielding or separating detectors from each other.
We also restrict ourselves to the case where each detector MPi always outputs value
r ∈ {±1}, and there is no inconclusive events, i.e.,
MPi (+1|c) +MPi (−1|c) = IPi for ∀c. (16)
Note this is not a new physical assumption, since any MPi can be transformed to this
type, e.g., by making it a rule that player P assigns a random number ±1 to output c
when detector i says inconclusive.
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4.2.2. Procedures of the protocol The actual E91 protocol proceeds as follows.
E91 Protocol, or Game 0 (G0): The E91 protocol with memoryless
uncharacterized detectors.
(i) (Quantum communication) Eve generates N :=
n
1− δ
(
1
1− q
)2
photon pairs
and sends them to Alice and Bob, where δ > 0 and q ≤ 1/2.
(ii) (Basis choice)
(a) (Choosing sample and sifted key pulse candidates) On each pulse i ∈
{1, . . . , N}, Alice labels bA,i ∈ {smp, sif} (denoting sample or sifted key
candidate) with probabilities 1 − q, q. Bob also labels bB,i ∈ {smp, sif} in
the same manner.
(b) (Alice’s basis choices) Alice does the following for each i: If bA,i = sif, let
the basis cA,i = z. If bA,i = smp, let cA,i = x, z with probability 1/2.
(c) (Bob’s basis choice) Bob does the following for each i: If bB,i = sif, let the
basis cB,i = z
′. If bB,i = smp, let cA,i = x, z with probability 1/2.
(iii) (Quantum measurement) Alice and Bob measure pulses using operators
MAi (cA,i) and M
B
i (cB,i). The results are recorded as (rA,i, rB,i) ∈ {±1}2.
(iv) (Determining whether continuing the protocol or not)
(a) Selection of sample and sifted key pulses:
1. Alice and Bob announce all their labels bA,i, bB,i and basis choices
cA,i, cB,i (i = 1, . . . , N).
2. Alice randomly selects lsmp := n
(
q
1− q
)2
pulses (resp., n pulses)
satisfying bA,i = bB,i = smp (resp., bA,i = bB,i = sif), and registers
those i as sample pulses Ismp ⊂ {1, . . . , N} (resp., Isif ⊂ {1, . . . , N}).
If it is found that there are less than enough pulses satisfying the
conditions, the protocol is aborted.
(b) Verification of the CHSH inequality:
1. Alice reveals {rA,i | i ∈ Ismp} to Bob.
2. Bob calculates
S =
1
lsmp
∑
i∈Ismp
(−1)rA,i+rB,i+t(cA,i,cB,i) (17)
where
t(cA, cB) :=
{
1 if cA = cB = x,
0 otherwise.
(18)
3. If S is less than a given predetermined threshold S0, Bob announces
that the protocol is aborted.
(c) Generation of the sifted key:
Alice lets her measurement results of sifted key pulses Isif be sifted key u,
and stores it in HU .
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(v) (Alice’s post-processing) Alice calculates syndrome vsyn of her sifted key for error
correction, and announces it to Bob. We assume that the syndrome length |vsyn|
satisfy |vsyn| ≤ lsyn.
Alice also selects a universal hash function fcor randomly with output length
|fcor(·)| = ⌈log(1/εcor)⌉, and announces fcor along with the hash value fcor(u) of
sifted key u.
Alice selects another universal hash function fpa with output length l randomly,
calculates secret key k = fpa(u), and stores it in HK .
(vi) (Bob’s post-processing)
Bob measures his sifted key pulses in the z′ basis to obtain his sifted key, and
obtains corrected key u′ by performing bit error correction using syndrome vsyn.
Then he verifies its correctness by checking if the hash value fcor(u
′) of Bob’s
sifted key equals fcor(u) sent from Alice. If they differ the protocol is aborted;
otherwise he obtains secret key of l bits by applying a privacy amplification on
the sifted key.
4.2.3. Remarks on the protocol besides security In Steps 2 and 4(a), Alice and Bob
choose sample and sifted key pulses randomly, and if they fail to assign enough
numbers of pulses, the protocol is aborted. This abortion due to pulse selections
occurs probabilistically and independently of Eve’s choice of the initial state ρABE .
This probability can be bounded by using the Chernoff bound (see, e.g., [33], Theorem
4.5) as
Pr[abort in Step 4(a)] ≤ 2e−(δq)2/2. (19)
Parameter S, calculated in Step 3 (b), corresponds to the average of outcomes of
the CHSH measurements. That is, according to constructions of Step 2 and 3, obtaining
S is equivalent to measuring each sample pulse i ∈ Ismp using
1
4
(MAi (z)⊗MBi (z) +MAi (z)⊗MBi (x)
+MAi (x)⊗MBi (z)−MAi (x)⊗MBi (x))
with the outcome si, and then calculating the average S = (lsmp)
−1∑
i∈Ismp si. In what
follows, we will often call S the CHSH parameter.
The uses of hash value fcor(u) in Steps 5 and 6 guarantees that this protocol is
εcor-correct (see, e.g., Ref. [25, 27]).
4.3. Security of the above protocol
Theorem 1 The E91 protocol above is ε-secure. That is, let ρKVEE91 be the final state
generated by the E91 Protocol (or Game 0) on the input of initial state ρABE , consisting
of secret key K, public communication V , and Eve’s sub-state in HE. Then we have
d1(ρ
KVE
E91 |V E) ≤ ε, (20)
Multi-partite squash operation and DIQKD 13
when the secret key length l is chosen to be
l = n
(
1− h
(
(1 +
√
2)
(
1√
2
− S0
)
+ µ′
))
− 2lsmp − lsyn − log2
1
εcor
− 2 log2
3
ε
, (21)
with δS and µ defined by
µ′ =
(
4
√
3(1 +
√
2) +
√
(n + lsmp)(lsmp + 1)
nlsmp
)√
1
lsmp
ln
6
ε
. (22)
where h(p) denotes the binary entropy: h(p) = −p log2 p− (1− p) log2(1− p).
This theorem can be obtained by using the leftover hashing lemma (Lemma 1), and
letting ε′ = ε/3 in the following lemma.
Lemma 4 Let ρUV EE91 be the state generated as a result of Steps 1 through 4 of the E91
Protocol (or Game 0) on the input of initial state ρABE, and U be the random variable
denoting the sifted key. Then ρUV EE91 satisfies, for an arbitrary value of 0 < ε
′ ≤ 1, we
have
Hε
′
min(ρ
UV E
E91 |V E)
≥ n
(
1− h
(
(1 +
√
2)
(
1√
2
− (S0 − δS)
)
+ µ
))
(23)
− 2lsmp − lsyn − log2
1
εcor
, (24)
where
δS =
√
48
lsmp
ln
2
ε′
, (25)
µ =
√
n + lsmp
nlsmp
lsmp + 1
lsmp
ln
2
ε′
. (26)
The proof of this lemma is given in the next section.
4.4. Key generation rate for the qubit-based implementation
In the ideal implementation of Ekert 1991 protocol, the entanglement source always
generates the Bell state
|Ψ+1〉 := 1√
2
(|0z〉A|0z′〉B + |1z〉A|1z′〉B) , (27)
which is then sent to Alice and Bob, and measured using (presumable) single photon
detectors. In this setting, it is customary to rotate Bob’s x, z bases by 45 degrees with
respect to those of Alice’s, such that S attains its maximum value 2
√
2 when channels
are noiseless. It is also customary to choose Bob’s z′ basis to be aligned with Alice’s z
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Figure 1. (Color online) Asymptotic key generation rates R versus quantum bit error
rate p. The bold black curve is our device-independent (DI) key generation rate for the
E91 protocol using memoryless detectors. The orange, red and blue curves are those
obtained in Ref. [24] (DI against collective attacks), Ref. [19] (DI using memoryless
detectors), and Refs. [22, 23] (fully DI), respectively. The gray curve is the rate of the
usual device-dependent scenario using the Pauli measurements and one-way classical
communications. We let the bit error correction efficiency fec = 1 for all the cases.
Note that we achieve a higher rate throughout the domain than those under the same
(red, [19]) or a severer (blue, [22, 23]) scenarios.
basis, so that their sifted keys match in the noiseless case. When channels are noisy,
e.g, the depolarizing channels with error rate p, the average of S is
S =
1− 2p√
2
(28)
and the bit error rate psif of sifted key equals p.
Corollary 1 In the above setting using single photon detectors, the asymptotic key
generation rate R := limn→∞ n/N satisfies
R = 1− h
(
(2 +
√
2)p
)
− fech(p), (29)
where fec is the efficiency of error correction, i.e., asymptotic syndrome length is
lsyn = fech(p).
Proof: For example, by choosing probability q of basis choices as q = n−1/2+ǫ, ǫ > 0, we
have µ′ → 0, lsmp/N → 0, n/N → 1 for n→∞, and obtain the lemma. 
Note that this rate R is improved upon those in the previous literature on the
device-independent E91 protocol [18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23], except for the one assuming
collective attacks [24] (see Figure 1).
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5. Proof of Lemma 4
The rest of this paper is devoted to the proof of Lemma 4. Our goal is to obtain a lower
bound of Hεmin(ρ
UV E
E91 |V E), with ρUV E a sifted key state generated by Alice and Bob in
Procotol 1, the E91 protocol. As the direct analysis of such a practical system is usually
cumbersome, we will use an indirect approach. We convert the protocol to simpler
procedures called games, which are defined as quantum operation which output a final
state ρUV E on the input of initial state ρABE . We use this terminology because some
of the converted procedures can no longer be considered as a communication protocol;
e.g., in Games 1, . . . , 4 below, a substitute player Charlie alone plays both of Alice’s and
Bob’s parts, and there is no communication.
In the proof below, we start with the E91 protocol, also called Game 0, and repeat
converting it to Games 1, 2, . . ., until we reach Game n, which is simple enough to
analyze directly. Games i will also be abbreviated as Gi in what follows. In order to
be able to bound the minimum entropy Hε
′
min(ρ
UV E
E91 |V E) of Game 0 by those of other
games, we design the conversions such that the minimum entropy of Game i is not larger
than that of the preceding game, Game i−1, possibly with a constant offset term li ≥ 0.
That is, we design conversions from Game i− 1 to i such that
min
ρABE
Hε
′
min(ρ
UV E
Gi−1|V E) ≥ min
ρABE
Hε
′
min(ρ
UV E
Gi |V E)− li, (30)
is satisfied for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Here ρUV EGi denotes the sifted key state generated as the
result of Game i, on the input of ρABE , i.e., ρUV EGi = ΠGi,sif(ρ
ABE). In this setting, it
is immediate that the minimum entropy of the original protocol is bounded by that of
Game n as
min
ρABE
Hε
′
min(ρ
UV E
E91 |V E) = min
ρABE
Hε
′
min(ρ
UV E
G0 |V E)
≥ min
ρABE
Hε
′
min(ρ
UV E
Gn |V E)−
n∑
i=1
li. (31)
Hence if a lower bound is obtained for the final Game n, then that of the E91 protocol
follows automatically. This type of situation is often described as ‘the security of the
original protocol is reduced to that of Game n’. We note that this approach using game
transformations is not essentially new, and is implicit in the previous literature, such as
[25, 8].
In our proof below, Game 0 is the E91 protocol (Protocol 1), and we convert it to
simpler Games i (i ≥ 1) satisfying relation (30), until we reach Game 4, a security game
of the BB84 protocol.
5.1. Definition of the security game and the basic strategy of our proof
As the first step, we define the following game.
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Game 1 (G1): Security game of the E91 protocol.
(i) (Input of the initial state) Charlie receives from Eve an initial state ρABE ∈
HA⊗HB⊗HE , with HA and HB each forming a space of N ′ := n+ lsmp photon
pulses.
(ii) (Selection of samples and measurement bases)
(a) Charlie selects lsmp pulse pairs randomly, label them as sample pulses:
Ismp ⊂ {1, . . . , N ′}, and announces it to Eve.
(b) For all sample pulses i ∈ Ismp, Charlie selects basis pairs (cA,i, cB,i) ∈
{(z, z), (z, x), (x, z), (x, x)}, each with probability 1/4.
(iii) (CHSH test) Charlie measures sample pulses i ∈ Ismp using operatorMAi (cA,i)⊗
MBi (cB,i). The results are recorded as (rA,i, rB,i) ∈ {±1}2. Then he calculates
the CHSH parameter S using (17) and (18), and if it is less than S0, he
announces to Eve that the protocol is aborted.
(iv) (Measurement of the sifted key) Charlie measures each sifted key pulse i ∈ Isif =
I¯smp = {1, . . . , N ′} \ Ismp, using MAi (z) ⊗ IB, and obtains a sifted key U of n
bits. Then he outputs the resulting state ρUV E.
This game varies from Protocol 1 in four points:
i) Alice’s and Bob’s procedures are all performed by a single substitute player, Charlie.
ii) For pulses that are neither samples nor sifted key, basis choices and measurement
results are omitted.
iii) Charlie does not measure Bob’s sifted key pulses.
iv) Charlie does not reveal basis choices of sample pulses, syndrome vsyn and hash value
fcor(u) to Eve, and keeps them secret.
It is straightforward to see that the first three modifications do not affect the output
state ρUV E, nor the minimum entropy Hε
′
min(ρ
UV E |V E). On the other hand, the fourth
modification can affect ρUV E , since it erases some information available to Eve through
public communication V , which is related with sifted key U as well as basis choice of
sample pulses. In order to compensate the effect on Hε
′
min(ρ
UV E|V E) due to this lack of
information properly, we borrow results of Ref. [25] and prove the following lemma.
Lemma 5 For an arbitrary initial state ρABE, we have
Hε
′
min(ρ
UV E
E91 |V E) ≥ Hε
′
min(ρ
UV E
G1 |V E)− 2lsmp − lsyn − log2
1
εcor
. (32)
Note that this is an example of inequality (30). The proof of this lemma is given in
Appendix C.
Multi-partite squash operation and DIQKD 17
5.2. Reduction to a qubit-based game
By borrowing the argument of Ref. [24], we may assume, without loss of generality,
that input pulses of Alice and Bob are all qubits.
Lemma 6 (c.f., Ref. [24], Lemma 1) It is not restrictive to suppose that Eve sends
to Alice and Bob a mixture ρAB =
∑
α,β pα,βρα,β of two-qubit states, together with
a classical ancilla (known to her) that carries the values α, β, and determines which
measurements MAα (cA) and M
B
β (cB) are to be used on ρα,β.
A proof sketch of this Lemma is given in Appendix D. For the complete proof, we ask
the reader to see Ref. [24], Section 2.4.
This lemma states that, there is no loss of security (i.e., Hmin(ρ
UV E|V E) does not
increase), even if we restrict ourselves to the case where Eve generates a two-qubit state,
accompanied by random variables α, β, which are then measured by Alice and Bob using
operators MAα (cA), M
B
β (cB). With a suitable choice of bases, M
A
α (cA), M
B
β (cB) can be
expressed as ZA, ZB, XAα , X
B
β given in Eqs. (12), (A.2), with α, β being complex
numbers satisfying |α| = |β| = 1. Thus the security of Game 1 can be reduced to that
of the following game,
Game 2 (G2): (Qubit-based security game of the E91 protocol with
uncharacterized detectors)
Same as Game 1 except
(i) (Input of the initial state)
(a) Eve selects complex numbers αi, βi (|αi| = |βi| = 1) for i ∈ {1, . . . , N ′},
and announces them to Charlie.
(b) Eve generates a state ρABE ∈ HA ⊗ HB ⊗ HE , with each of HA and HB
consisting of N ′ qubit spaces, and gives it to Charlie.
(iii) (CHSH test) Charlie measures all i ∈ Ismp projectively using operators
ZA⊗ZB, ZA⊗XBβi, XAαi ⊗ZB, XAαi ⊗XBβi according to basis choices (cAi , cBi ) =
(z, z), (z, x), (x, z), (x, x). The results are recorded as (rAi , r
B
i ) ∈ {±1}2. Then
he calculates the CHSH parameter S using (17) and (18), and if it is less than
S0, he announces to Eve that the protocol is aborted.
(iv) (Measurement of the sifted key) Charlie measures each sifted key pulse i ∈ Isif =
I¯smp = {1, . . . , N ′}\ Ismp by using ZA⊗ IB, and obtains a sifted key U of n bits.
Then he outputs the resulting state ρUV E.
and we have the following lemma.
Lemma 7 For an arbitrary initial state
min
ρABE
Hε
′
min(ρ
UV E
G2 |V E) ≤ min
ρABE
Hε
′
min(ρ
UV E
G1 |V E). (33)
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5.3. Conversion to coherent CHSH measurements
Unlike Alice and Bob in the actual E91 protocol, Charlie in Games 1 and 2 does not
reveal basis choices of sample pulses to Eve. Hence, performing projective measurements
using operators ZA⊗ZB, ZA⊗XBβ , XAα ⊗ZB, XAα ⊗XBβ in Step 4 in Game 2 (according
to randomly chosen cA, cB ∈ {x, z}) is equivalent to performing a measurement using a
POVM
Mα,β(±1|CHSH) := 1
2
(
I
A ⊗ IB ±Mα,β(CHSH)
)
, (34)
where
Mα,β(CHSH) :=
1
4
(ZA ⊗ ZB + ZA ⊗XBβ (35)
+XAα ⊗ ZB −XAα ⊗XBβ ).
It is straightforward to verify that Mα,β(CHSH) can be diagonalized as
Mα,β(CHSH) =
∑
a=±1
a
(|µ||Ψaµ〉〈Ψaµ|+ |ν||Φaν〉〈Φaν |) (36)
where parameters µ, ν are defined by
µ(α, β) =
1
4
(1 + α + β − αβ), (37)
ν(α, β) =
1
4
(1 + α + β∗ − αβ∗), (38)
and vectors {|Ψ±1µ 〉, |Φ±1ν 〉} are the Bell states defined by
|Ψ±1µ 〉 =
1√
2
(
|0y〉A|0y〉B ± µ|µ| |1y〉
A|1y〉B
)
, (39)
|Φ±1ν 〉 =
1√
2
(
|0y〉A|1y〉B ± ν|ν| |1y〉
A|0y〉B
)
. (40)
Note here that parameters |µ|, |ν| satisfy
|µ|2 + |ν|2 = 1
2
. (41)
and thus |µ|, |ν| ≤ 1√
2
.
Note that POVM measurement Mα,β(±1|CHSH), defined by (34), is equivalent to:
a) performing projective measurement Mα,β(CHSH) to obtain a result ∈ {±|µ|,±|ν|},
and then b) adding to it a noise factor ∈ {±1± |µ|,±1± |ν|} chosen locally by Charlie
by a certain probability distribution. The projective measurement Mα,β(CHSH) can
further be decomposed as: a-1) performing the Bell state measurement, and then a-2)
outputting ±|µ| when |Ψ±1〉 are measured, and ±|ν| when |Φ±1〉.
Hence, as a result, Game 2 can be rewritten in the following equivalent form:
Game 2’ (G2’): Same as Game 2 except
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(iii) (CHSH test by POVM Mα,β(±1|CHSH)) Charlie performs the Bell measure-
ment on each sample pulse i ∈ Ismp using the basis {|Ψ±1µi 〉, |Φ±1νi 〉}. If he mea-
sures |Ψaµi〉, he outputs si = b with probability 12(1+ ab|µi|), where a, b ∈ {±1},
and if he measures |Φaνi〉, he outputs si = b with probability 12(1 + ab|νi|).
If the average S = (lsmp)
−1∑
i∈Ismp si is below the threshold value S0, he
announces that the protocol is aborted.
In this game the noise factors {±1 ± |µi|,±1 ± |νi|} occur independently for each
pulse i with a probability independent of Eve’s attack, so their perturbation to the
average S converge to zero rapidly with sample pulse number lsmp = |Ismp| → ∞. Hence
the average S can be replaced with the average of measurement results {±|µi|,±|νi|}
obtained by measurement Mαi,βi(CHSH) up to a negligible error probability. That is,
for a new game defined as follows:
Game 3 (G3): Same as Game 2 except
(iii) (CHSH test by projective measurements with Mα,β(CHSH)) Charlie measures
each sample pulse i ∈ Ismp projectively with the basis {|Ψ±1µi 〉, |Φ±1νi 〉}, and
outputs si ∈ {±|µi|,±|νi|} respectively. If the average S = (lsmp)−1
∑
i∈Ismp si
is below the threshold S0 − δS, he announces that the protocol is aborted.
we have the following lemma:
Lemma 8
min
ρABE
Hε
′
min(ρ
UV E
G2 |V E) ≥ min
ρABE
H
ε′/2
min (ρ
UV E
G3 |V E) (42)
ε′
2
= exp(−lsmp(δS)2/48). (43)
The proof is straightforward, and is given in Appendix G.
5.4. Bipartite squash operation
The CHSH test of Game 3 still depends on parameters α and β, chosen arbitrarily
by Eve. Our next step is to eliminate this α, β-dependence by converting them to a
measurement consisting only of the usual Pauli operators X,Z. For this purpose, we
introduce a bipartite squash operation, Fα,β , corresponding to Mα,β(CHSH).
Theorem 2 For any α,β satisfying (41), there exists a squash operation Fα,β satisfying
F †α,β
(
ZA ⊗ IB) = ZA ⊗ IB. (44)
F †α,β
(
I+ (
√
2− 1)XA ⊗XB
)
≥ 2Mα,β(CHSH), (45)
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The proof of this theorem is given in Appendix E.
Condition (44) guarantees that sifted key U has the same probability distribution
whether Fα,β is applied or not. It is an equality between POVM elements, as used in
the previous formalism of the 1-partite squash operation. On the other hand, condition
(45) deviates the previous formalism in that it is a relation between observables, not
POVMs, so we elaborate on it and justify its use below.
The CHSH test of Game 3 is equivalent to checking
1
lsmp
∑
i∈Ismp
2Mαi,βi(CHSH)
AiBi ≥ 2(S0 − δS), (46)
Suppose now that Charlie performs the CHSH test using F †α,β(· · ·) on the l.h.s. of (45),
instead of 2Mα,β(CHSH) on the r.h.s., without changing the threshold S0 − δS. Then
the test condition (46) becomes changed to
1
lsmp
∑
i∈Ismp
F †αi,βi
(
I
AiBi + (
√
2− 1)XAi ⊗XBi
)
≥ 2(S0 − δS). (47)
It is easy to see that any input state ρUSV E that can pass the CHSH test (46) always
passes the new test (47) because of (45). In this case we say that the new test (47) is
weaker than (46).
More generally, we say that the CHSH test using observableM1 is stronger (weaker)
than that using M2, whenever M1 ≤M2 (M1 ≥M2) and they share the same threshold
value for S. In this terminology, we can prove that a stronger CHSH test results in an
equal or larger minimum entropy Hmin(ρ
UV E |V E). Recall that we assume memoryless
detectors, and thus sifted key U and sample bits S belong to different vector spaces
(different sectors of tensor product). In this case the CHSH test works as a filter that
transforms an input ρUSV E to the output ρUV E . Hence if the same state ρUSV E is
CHSH-tested using observables M1 ≤ M2, the resulting states satisfy ρUV E1 ≤ ρUV E2 ,
which leads to Hmin(ρ
UV E
1 |V E) ≥ Hmin(ρUV E2 |V E) due to the property of the minimum
entropy. A more rigorous argument is given in Appendix F.
We advance our game transformation further by applying this argument to Game
3. By replacing condition (46) of Game 3 with (47), we obtain the following game:¶
Game 4 (G4): Same as Game 2 except
(i) (Input of the initial state)
(a) Same as Game 2.
(b) Same as Game 2.
(c) Charlie applies squash operations Fαi,βi to qubit pairs i ∈ {1, . . . , N} given
by Eve
¶ In Game 4, we divide F †αi,βi
(
I
AiBi + (
√
2− 1)XAi ⊗XBi) of (47) into two steps: Fαi,βi in Step (i)(c)
and the XAi ⊗XBi measurement in Step (iii). We made this division so that the transition from Game
4 to 5 in the next subsection becomes transparent. Note that this division does not affect the argument
of this subsection, since it preserves the relation between inputs ρABE and outputs ρUV E of Game 4.
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(iii) (Phase error measurements by operator XA ⊗ XB) Charlie measures sample
pulse i ∈ Ismp using operator XAi ⊗ XBi and obtains results ti = ±1. He
announces that the protocol is aborted whenever
1
lsmp
∑
i∈Ismp
ti ≥
S0 − δS − 12
1√
2
− 1
2
(48)
Due to (45), the CHSH test condition of this game, (47), is weaker than that of Game
3, (46). Hence for the same input state ρUSV E , the minimum entropies after the CHSH
tests of each game satisfy Hmin(ρ
UV E
G3 |V E) ≥ Hmin(ρUV EG4 |V E). From this we obtain the
following lemma:
Lemma 9
min
ρABE
H
ε′/2
min (ρ
UV E
G3 |V E) ≥ min
ρABE
H
ε′/2
min (ρ
UV E
G4 |V E) (49)
Now the whole quantum operation performed by Charlie in Step (i) of Game
4 can be regarded as a bipartite squash operation. Thus we can apply the same
argument as in Section 2.2, and reduce this game to the following one where there
is no squash operation. Also, by noting that the phase error rate of samples is
given by p = 1
2
(
1− lsmp−1
∑
i∈Ismp ti
)
, we see that condition (48) is equivalent to
p ≤ (1 +√2)
(
1√
2
− (S0 − δS)
)
. Hence, for the following game,
Game 5 (G5): Same as Game 2 except
(i) (Input of the initial state) Eve generates a state ρABE ∈ HA ⊗HB ⊗HE, with
each of HA and HB consisting of N ′ qubit spaces, and gives it to Charlie.
(iii) (Phase error measurement using X⊗X) Charlie detects phase errors of sample
pulses i ∈ Ismp using operator XA⊗XB, and aborts the protocol whenever the
phase error rate p satisfies
p ≤ (1 +
√
2)
(
1√
2
− (S0 − δS)
)
. (50)
we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 10
min
ρABE
H
ε′/2
min (ρ
UV E
G4 |V E) ≥ min
ρABE
H
ε′/2
min (ρ
UV E
G5 |V E). (51)
5.5. Calculation of the key generation rate
Since Game 5 is equivalent to the BB84 protocol, by applying the existing security
proofs of the BB84 protocol [8, 25, 26, 27], we can bound H
ε′/2
min (ρ
UV E
G5 |E) from below.
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For example, by using a simple formula derived in [27] for the finite length case, we
obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 11 The output of Game 5, ρUV EG5 , satisfies
H
ε′/2
min (ρ
UV E
G4 |V E) ≥ n
(
1− h
(
(1 +
√
2)
(
1√
2
− (S0 − δS)
)
+ µ
))
. (52)
Proof: We follow the gedankenexperiment approach used in the security proof of
[27]. Suppose that Alice and Bob perform x basis measurement on all the squashed
qubits, and denote Alice’s measurement result by W and Bob’s by W ′. Then their
maximum entropy is bounded by the threshold Qtol of phase error rate of sample bits
as
Hε
′/2
max(W |W ′) ≤ nh(Qtol + µ)
= nh
(
(1 +
√
2)
(
1√
2
− (S0 − δS)
)
+ µ
)
(53)
with µ defined in (26). Combining this inequality with the uncertainty relation for
smooth entropies derived in [34]
H
ε′/2
min (U |V E) +Hε
′/2
max(W |W ′) ≥ n, (54)
we obtain the lemma. Here we used the notation H
ε′/2
min (U |V E) = Hε
′/2
min (ρ
UV E |V E). 
5.6. Proof of Lemma 4
By combining Lemmas 5, 7, 8 9, 10, and 11, we obtain Lemma 4.
6. Conclusion
We proposed a generalization of the squash operations involving multi-partite
measurements, and demonstrated that it allows us to prove the security of a wider
class of QKD systems than previously possible. In particular, we applied our method to
prove the device-independent security of the Ekert 1991 (E91) protocol, and improved
the key generation rate.
Note that for the conventional formalism of the 1-partite squash operation, there
are explicit counterexamples, such as the one given in Lemma 3. Hence our result on
the device-independent E91 protocol is a concrete evidence that our approach indeed
allows one to apply the squash operation to a wider class of protocols or detectors than
previously possible.
We do not yet know how wide it will eventually be. Neither do we see any explicit
limitation. In this sense, possible future directions would be to investigate whether
the techniques developed here can be applied to the cases where detectors are not
memoryless, and to where two way classical communications are used for post processing.
It is also interesting to reinterpret the existing security proofs of partially device-
independent or device-dependent protocols (e.g., Refs. [35, 36]) using our method,
and to develop them further.
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Appendix A. Notation of the Pauli matrices
Throughout the paper, we use the y-basis repersentation of the Pauli operators
represented as
X =
(
0 −i
i 0
)
, Y =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
, Z =
(
0 1
1 0
)
. (A.1)
These Pauli matrices are the same as those used in most papers and textbooks, except
that they are represented in the y-basis: |by〉 = 1√2
(|0z〉+ (−1)bi|1z〉), b ∈ {0, 1}. One
can recover the usual forms by rewriting them in the z-basis |bz〉.
We also introduce the generalized X operator, parametrized by a complex number
α satisfying |α| = 1, as
Xα =
(
0 α
α∗ 0
)
. (A.2)
Note that this interpolates between X and Z: X = X−i, Z = X1 with i =
√−1.
Appendix B. Proof of Lemma 2
Consider the following intermediate protocol:
Protocol 1’ (PR1’): Intermediate protocol using squash operation. This is same
as Protocol 1 except
(i) Eve generates quantum state ρABE , and sends its sub-states in HA and HB,
each consisting of N tensor products of HM , to Alice and Bob, respectively.
Alice and Bob then apply squash operation F and stores the resulting qubit
states in HA¯ and HB¯.
(iii) Same as Protocol 2.
All operations in Protocol 1’ are identical to Protocol 1. The only difference is that
the measurements Mc performed in Step 3 of Protocol 1 are divided into two steps, the
squash operation F of Step 1 and qubit measurements σc of Step 3. Hence we have the
following relation:
Πsif,PR1
(
ρABE
)
= Πsif,PR1′
(
ρABE
)
. (B.1)
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Next by definition, we have
Πsif,PR1′(ρ
ABE) = Πsif,PR2((Ftot ⊗ IE)(ρABE)), (B.2)
Ftot = (
⊗
i
FA,i)⊗ (
⊗
j
FB,j). (B.3)
That is, inputting ρABE to Protocol 1’ is equivalent to applying squash operation Ftot⊗IE
on ρABE first and then inputting the resulting state to Protocol 2. Hence we have
min
ρABE
Hmin
(
ρUV EPR1 |V E
)
= min
ρABE
Hmin
(
Πsif,PR1
(
ρABE
) |V E)
= min
ρABE
Hmin
(
Πsif,PR1′
(
ρABE
) |V E)
= min
ρABE
Hmin(Πsif,PR2((Ftot ⊗ IE)(ρABE)|V E)
= min
ρA¯B¯E=(Ftot⊗IE)(ρABE )
Hmin(Πsif,PR2(ρ
A¯B¯E)|V E)
≥ min
ρA¯B¯E
Hmin(Πsif,PR2(ρ
A¯B¯E)|V E) (B.4)
= min
ρABE
Hmin(ρ
UV E
PR2 |V E), (B.5)
where the minimum on the fifth line is over all ρA¯B¯E for which there exists ρABE satisfying
ρA¯B¯E = (Ftot ⊗ IE)(ρABE).
Appendix C. Proof of Lemma 5
We divide the random variable V describing the public information available to Eve in
the E91 protocol into two parts; V1 describing basis choice of sample bits, syndrome vsyn
and hash value fcor(u), and V2 describing all the remaining part . Then by using Eq.
(3.21) of Ref. [25], and noting that V1 can be described in 2lsmp + lsyn + log2
1
εcor
bits,
we have
Hε
′
min(ρ
UV E
E91 |V E) = Hε
′
min(ρ
UV1V2E
E91 |V1V2E)
≥ Hε′min(ρUV1V2EE91 |V2E)−Hmax(ρV2E91)
≥ Hε′min(ρUV1V2EE91 |V2E)− 2lsmp − lsyn − log2
1
εcor
. (C.1)
By noting that F2 is a classical random variable, and by slightly modifying Lemma 3.1.9
of Ref. [25], we have
Hε
′
min(ρ
UV1V2E
E91 |V2E) ≥ Hε
′
min(ρ
UV2E
E91 |V2E) = Hε
′
min(ρ
UV E
G1 |V E). (C.2)
From (C.1) and (C.2), we obtain the lemma. 
Appendix D. Proof of Lemma 6
We give a proof sketch of Lemma 6. For the complete proof, we ask the reader to see
Section 2.4 of Ref. [24]. Also keep in mind that we here only discuss Alice’s detector,
because the proof for Bob’s detector can be given in exactly the same way.
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First, we show that (Alice’s) POVM measurements M(r|c) (c ∈ {x, z}, r ∈ {±1})
can be rewritten as projective measurements in a Hilbert space, augmented by an ancilla
(see, e.g., [37]).
Lemma 12 (Implicit in the proof of Lemma 1 [24]) Given POVMMc,±1 : HM →
{±1} satisfying
M(+1|c) +M(−1|c) = IM for c ∈ {x, z}, (D.1)
there exist an ancilla ξ ∈ HM ′ and projection operators P (r|c) in HM ⊗HM ′ satisfying
M(r|c)(ρ) = P (r|c)(ρ⊗ ξ) (D.2)
for an arbitrary ρ ∈ HM , and
P (+1|c) + P (−1|c) = IMM ′ for c ∈ {x, z}. (D.3)
Proof: By using the completeness relation (D.1) for Mc, and the equivalence of
POVM and general measurements (see, e.g., Section 2.2 of [37]), we see that, for each
basis c ∈ {x, z}, there exists an ancilla ξc and projection operators P˜ (r|c) in HM ⊗Hc,
satisfying M(r|c)(ρ) = P˜ (r|c)(ρ ⊗ ξc) for an arbitrary state ρ ∈ HM . Then by letting
ξ = ξx ⊗ ξz, P (r|x) = P˜ (r|x)⊗ Iz and P (r|z) = P˜ (r|z)⊗ Ix, we obtain the lemma. 
Hence Game 1 can be rewritten in the form where Charlie prepares ancillas ξ for
all detectors, and then measures the initial state ρABE together with ξ using projections
P (r|c) satisfying (D.3). We further modify this game such that ξ is prepared by Eve,
instead of Charlie, and call it Game 1’. In this case, the value of minimum entropy
minρABE Hmin(ρ
UV E |V E), realized in this modified game, is never larger than in Game
1, since Eve has a larger choice of ρABE . Additionally, Game 1’ can also be considered
as a limited case of Game 1 where Charlie’s measurements are P (r|c). Thus, as long as
our goal is to bound minρABE Hmin(ρ
UV E |V E) from below, there is no loss of generality
in assuming that Charlie’s detector are projections P (r|c) satisfying (D.3).
By introducing operators Ac := P (+1|c)− P (−1|c) for c = x, z, this condition can
be rewritten as Ax
2 = Az
2 = IMM
′
, for which the following lemma can be applied.
Lemma 13 (Ref. [24], Lemma 2) Let Ax and Az be Hermitian operators with
eigenvalues equal to ±1 acting on a Hilbert space H of finite or countable infinite
dimension. Then we can decompose the Hilbert space H as a direct sum
H =
⊕
α
H2α (D.4)
such that dim(H2α) ≤ 2 for all α, and such that both Ax and Az act within H2α, that is,
if |ψ〉 ∈ H2α, then Ax|ψ〉 ∈ H2α and Az|ψ〉 ∈ H2α.
Hence operators Ac, as well as P (r|c), can all be block diagonalized to two-qubit
subspaces labeled by α. Hence P (r|c) can be decomposed as a projective measurement
that specifies subspace α, followed by qubit measurements performed inHα. This means
that the index α may be considered as a classical variable conveyed from Eve to the
legitimate player. This concludes the proof of Lemma 6.
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Appendix E. Proof of Theorem 2
Define an operator
M ′α,β(CHSH) :=Mα,β(CHSH) + 2|µ||Ψ−1µ 〉〈Ψ−1µ |+ 2|ν||Φ−1ν 〉〈Φ−1ν |. (E.1)
It is straightforward to show that it satisfies
M ′α,β(CHSH) ≥Mα,β(CHSH). (E.2)
and that it can also be written as
M ′α,β(CHSH) =
∑
a=±1
(|µ||Ψaµ〉〈Ψaµ|+ |ν||Φaν〉〈Φaν |)
=
|µ|+ |ν|
2
I
AB +
|µ| − |ν|
2
Y A ⊗ Y B.
As the coefficients satisfy (|µ|+ |ν|)2 + (|µ| − |ν|)2 = 2(|µ|2 + |ν|2) = 1 and |µ|+ |ν| ≥
|µ|−|ν|, the operatorM ′α,β(CHSH) can further be rewritten using an angular parameter
|φ(α, β)| ≤ π/4 as
M ′α,β(CHSH) =
1
2
(
cosφ(α, β)IAB + sin φ(α, β)Y A ⊗ Y B) . (E.3)
Then by noting that Inequality (45) is equivalent to
(1 +
√
2)
(
I
AB − 2Mα,β(CHSH)
)
+ F †α,β(X
A ⊗XB) ≥ 0, (E.4)
and by using (E.2), we see that Inequality (45) holds if
Nα,β := (1 +
√
2)
(
1− 2M ′α,β(CHSH)
)
+ F †α,β(X ⊗X) (E.5)
= (1 +
√
2)
(
(1− cosφ)IAB + sinφY A ⊗ Y B)+ F †α,β(X ⊗X) ≥ 0.
Hence, in order to prove Theorem 2, it suffices to construct Fα,β satisfying (44) and
N ≥ 0 explicitly. For that purpose, it suffices to construct Fα,β satisfying (44) and
F †α,β(X
A ⊗XB) = aY A ⊗ Y B, (E.6)
a = − Sign(sinφ)×min(1, (1 +
√
2)| sinφ|), (E.7)
where Sign(sinφ) = ±1 according to the sign of sin φ. Note that |a| ≤ 1.
One can indeed construct Fα,β satisfying (E.6) and (E.7), e.g., by i) applying 90
degree Z rotation to both A and B so that XA ⊗ XB → Y A ⊗ Y B, and then ii) 180
degree Z rotation to B only so that Y A⊗Y B → −Y A⊗Y B, with probability (1−a)/2.
Note that (44) holds automatically since only Z rotations are used. Nα,β ≥ 0 can be
verified as follows: If | sinφ| ≤ 1/(1 +√2) then N = (1 +√2)(1 − cosφ)IAB ≥ 0. On
the other hand if | sinφ| > 1/(1 +√2), we have
N = (1 +
√
2)(1− cosφ)IAB + ((1 +
√
2)| sinφ| − 1)Sign(sinφ)Y A ⊗ Y B
≥ (1 +
√
2)(1− cosφ)− ((1 +
√
2)| sinφ| − 1))IAB
= (1 +
√
2)(
√
2− cosφ− | sinφ|)IAB ≥ 0. (E.8)
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Appendix F. Stronger Bell test does not decrease the smooth minimum
entropy
Here we will prove a lemma, whose meaning can be roughly stated as: If one replaces
one’s Bell test measurement with a stricter one, then the minimum entropy of the state
after passing it becomes larger. This may sound obvious intuitively, but we give a proof
for the completeness of our presentation.
We begin by defining exactly what we want to prove. Let Qi and Ri be two Bell
measurement operators, defined for each pulse pair i ∈ Ismp; Qi and Ri may vary
depending on i. Assume that absolute values of their eigenvalues are bounded from
above uniformly by a constant M > 0 which does not depend on i, and that they satisfy
Qi ≤ Ri for any i ∈ Ismp. (F.1)
Define their averages to be Qˆ := lsmp
−1∑
i∈Ismp Qi, Pˆ := lsmp
−1∑
i∈Ismp Pi, then we also
have
Qˆ ≤ Rˆ. (F.2)
Hence the Bell test using Qˆ is stricter than that using Rˆ, when the same threshold S is
used.
Also consider a projection operator PQ that outputs 1 when the projective
measurement Qˆ outputs a value larger than or equal to S, and outputs 0 otherwise. This
operator, PQ, works as a filter that erases the input state whenever the Bell measurement
Qˆ outputs a value smaller than S. PR is also defined in the same way as the filter that
erases the input whenever Rˆ outputs a value smaller than S.
With these operators, the state after the Bell test by operator Qˆ is represented as
ρUV EQ = TrS(ρ
USV E
Q ), (F.3)
where
ρUSV EQ = (I
U ⊗ PQ ⊗ IV E)ρUSV E(IU ⊗ PQ ⊗ IV E)†. (F.4)
The state after the Bell test Rˆ, i.e., ρUV EQ , is also defined by replacing subscript Q in
(F.3), (F.4) with R.
In this setting, we want to prove that the minimum entropy of ρUV EQ (state after the
stronger Bell test) is not smaller than that of ρUV EQ (state after the weaker Bell test).
This can be stated exactly as follows:
Lemma 14 Under the above setting, operators PQ, PR commute with each other and
satisfy
PQ ≤ PR. (F.5)
The smooth minimum entropy of the corresponding states ρUV EP , ρ
UV E
Q satisfy
Hεmin(ρ
UV E
Q |V E) ≥ Hεmin(ρUV ER |V E). (F.6)
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Proof: Let VQb, VRb (b ∈ {0, 1}) be the eigenspace of PQ, PR associated with
eigenvalue b. If there exists a state |ψ〉 ∈ VQ1 ∩ VR0, |ψ〉 6= 0, then we obtain an
inequality S ≤ 〈ψ|Qˆ|ψ〉 ≤ 〈ψ|Rˆ|ψ〉 ≤ S−δS, with S−δS being the largest of eigenvalues
of Rˆ that are smaller than S. But this is absurd so VQ1 ∩ VP0 = {0}, which implies
[PQ, 1−PR] = 0 and thus [PQ, PR] = 0. Hence PQ, PR are simultaneously diagonalizable,
and (F.5) follows immediately from (F.2).
Since [PQ, PR] = 0 and (F.5), PQ = PQPR holds, so
ρUSV EQ = (I
U ⊗ PQ ⊗ IV E)ρUSV ER (IU ⊗ PQ ⊗ IV E)†. (F.7)
By noting that PQ is a completely positive map, we can apply the date processing
inequality ([38], Theorem 5.7) to ρUSV ER , and obtain (F.6). 
Appendix G. Proof of Lemma 8
We first prove the following lemma, and then use it to prove Lemma 8.
Lemma 15 Denote random variable S in Game 2’, Game 3 by SG2′, SG3 respectively.
Then
Pr [|SG2′ − SG3| ≥ δS] ≤ ε
′′
2
, (G.1)
where
ε′′
2
:= exp(−lsmp(δS)2/48). (G.2)
Proof of Lemma 15: Denote random variable si of Game 2’, Game 3 by sG2′,i, sG3,i
respectively, then Sn = lsmp
−1∑
i∈Ismp sGn,i for n = 2
′, 3. Also define a random variable
ti := sG2′,i−sG3,i, then it follows that their expected value is zero: 〈ti〉 = 0 for ∀i ∈ Ismp.
One can also verify easily that ti, tj of different pulse pairs i, j are independent from each
other, and that their differences satisfy |ti − ti−1| ≤ 2(1 +
√
2). Thus we can apply the
Azuma-Hoeffding inequality (see, e.g., Theorem 12.4, [33]) to their average, SG2′ −SG3,
and obtain the lemma. 
Proof of Lemma 8: By using Lemma 15 and by noting that the Bell test
measurements of Game 2’ and in Game 3 commute with each other, we have
‖∆ρUSV E‖ ≤ ε′′, (G.3)
ρUV EG2′ +∆ρ
UV E ≤ ρUV EG3 . (G.4)
By using (G.3) and by definition of smooth min-entropy, we have Hε
′+ε′′
min (ρ
UV E
G2′ |V E) ≥
Hε
′
min(ρ
UV E
G2′ + ∆ρ
UV E|V E). By using (G.4) and the data processing inequality ([38],
Theorem 5.7), we also obtain Hε
′
min(ρ
UV E
G2′ +∆ρ
UV E |V E) ≥ Hε′min(ρUSEG3 |V E). Combining
these two inequalities, we have Hε
′+ε′′
min (ρ
UV E
G2′ |V E) ≥ Hε′min(ρUSEG3 |V E). 
[1] Bennett C H and Brassard G 1984 in Proceeding of the IEEE International Conference on
Computers, Systems, and Signal Processing, Bangalore, India (IEEE, New York, 1984) 175–
179
[2] Ekert A K 1991 Phys. Rev. Lett. 67(6) 661–663
Multi-partite squash operation and DIQKD 29
[3] Bennett C H 1992 Phys. Rev. Lett. 68(21) 3121–3124
[4] Inoue K, Waks E and Yamamoto Y 2002 Phys. Rev. Lett. 89(3) 037902
[5] Grosshans F and Grangier P 2002 Phys. Rev. Lett. 88(5) 057902
[6] Hirano T, Yamanaka H, Ashikaga M, Konishi T and Namiki R 2003 Phys. Rev. A 68(4) 042331
[7] Sasaki T, Yamamoto Y and Koashi M 2014 Nature 509 475–478
[8] Shor P W and Preskill J 2000 Phys. Rev. Lett. 85 441–444
[9] Kraus B, Gisin N and Renner R 2005 Phys. Rev. Lett. 95 080501
[10] Koashi M 2007 arXiv:0704.3661 [quant-ph]
[11] Tsurumaru T and Tamaki K 2008 Phys. Rev. A 78 032302
[12] Beaudry N J, Moroder T and Lu¨tkenhaus N 2008 Phys. Rev. Lett. 101 093601
[13] Gottesman D, Lo H K, Lu¨tkenhaus N and Preskill J 2004 Quant. Inf. Comput. 5 325
[14] Gittsovich O, Beaudry N J, Narasimhachar V, Alvarez R R, Moroder T and Lu¨tkenhaus N 2014
Phys. Rev. A 89 012325
[15] Tsurumaru T 2010 Phys. Rev. A 81 012328
[16] Moroder T, Gu¨hne O, Beaudry N, Piani M and Lu¨tkenhaus N 2010 Phys. Rev. A 81 052342
[17] Clauser J F, Horne M A, Shimony A and Holt R A 1969 Phys. Rev. Lett. 23(15) 880–884
[18] Ha¨nggi E, Renner R and Wolf S 2010 Lecture Notes in Computer Science 6110 216–234
[19] Masanes L, Pironio S and Ac´ın A 2011 Nature Communications 2 238
[20] Barrett J, Colbeck R and Kent A 2012 Phys. Rev. A 86 062326
[21] Reichardt B W, Unger F and Vazirani U 2013 Nature 496 456–460
[22] Vazirani U and Vidick T 2014 Phys. Rev. Lett. 113 140501
[23] Vazirani U and Vidick T 2016 Phys. Rev. Lett. 116 089901
[24] Pironio S, Ac´ın A, Brunner N, Gisin N, Massar S and Scarani V 2009 New J. Phys. 11 045021
[25] Renner R 2005 Security of Quantum Key Distribution Ph.D. thesis Diss. ETH No. 16242
[26] Hayashi M and Tsurumaru T 2012 New J. Phys. 14 093014
[27] Tomamichel M, Lim C C W, Gisin N and Renner R 2012 Nature Communications 3 634
[28] Ben-Or M, Horodecki M, Leung DW, Mayers D and Oppenheim J 2005 Lecture Notes in Computer
Science 3378 386–406
[29] Carter J L and Wegman M N 1979 Journal of Computer and System Sciences 18 143–154
[30] Fehr S and Schaffner C 2008 Theory of Cryptography Fifth Theory of Cryptography Conference,
TCC 2008 New York, USA, March 19-21, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 4948 465–481
[31] Tsurumaru T and Hayashi M 2013 IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 59 4700–4717
[32] Hayashi M and Tsurumaru T 2013 arXiv:1311.5322 [quant-ph]
[33] Mitzenmacher M and Upfal E 2005 Probability and Computing: Randomized Algorithms and
Probabilistic Analysis (Cambrige University Press, Cambridge, UK)
[34] Tomamichel M and Renner R 2011 Phys. Rev. Lett. 106 110506
[35] Gittsovich O and Moroder T 2014 AIP Conf. Proc. 1633 156
[36] Matsumoto R 2013 In Proc. 2013 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory 351–353
[37] Nielsen M A and Chuang I L 2000 Quantum Computation and Quantum Information (Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press)
[38] Tomamichel M 2012 A Framework for Non-Asymptotic Quantum Information Theory Ph.D. thesis
Diss. ETH No. 20213
